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COMMENTS 
Refining the Traditional Theories of Recovery for 
Consumer Mental Anguish 
Emotional distress naturally results from offensive, abusive, 
or otherwise dissatisfactory consumer transactions, yet the law 
has been reluctant to redress emotional injuries caused by offen- 
sive business practices.l In almost all cases a finding of extreme 
and outrageous conduct is required before recovery is granted.2 
Only in cases involving common carriers, innkeepers, and other 
public utilities, which have become uniquely liable for the insults 
and indignities of their employees, does the law grant recovery for 
offensive conduct short of extreme ~ u t r a g e . ~  If the words or con- 
duct of a private business are not extreme and outrageous, some 
legal scholars have queried whether a cause of action should nev- 
ertheless be recognized based on an extension of the liability im- 
posed on public ~t i l i t ies .~ 
This Comment will discuss briefly the roles of tort and con- 
tract in consumer mental anguish recovery, and then examine in 
greater detail the historical and economic rationale for imposing 
liability on public utilities for the insults and indignities of their 
employees. The Comment will then examine recent decisions that 
allow consumer recovery for emotional distress on the basis of 
traditional common law notions of. liability. Finally, a proposal 
for a new framework of consumer recovery will be made. 
1. Stavnezer v. Sage-Allen & Co., 146 Conn. 460,152 A.2d 312 (1959); Slocum v. Food 
Fair Stores, 100 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1958); Name v. Mayflower Tavern, Inc., 106 Utah 517, 
150 P.2d 773 (1944). See Borda, One's Right to Enjoy Mental Peace and Tranquility, 28 
GEO. L.J. 55 (1939). In recent times the judiciary has shown a greater willingness to 
recognize emotional interests as legally protectable, but recovery is still limited by strict 
review of the facts in each case, taking into consideration the foreseeability of harm to 
the emotions, the unreasonableness of the actor's conduct, and the gravity of distress. Id. 
a t  56-57. 
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 4 46, Comment d (1965). 
3. See Prmer,  Insult and Outrage, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 40, 59-63 (1956). Recovery is 
limited to cases where the conduct of the defendant, "although falling short of extreme 
outrage, still rises above the level of petty and trivial offensiveness." Id. a t  63. 
4. Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HAW. L. 
REV. 1033, 1052 (1936); Prosser, supra note 3, at 63; Wade, Tort Liability for Abusive and 
Insulting Language, 4 VAND. L. REV. 63, 69-70 (1950). 
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Historically, two theoretical foundations permit a purchaser 
to recover damages for emotional distress arising from a consumer 
transaction.) The purchaser can base his recovery for mental suf- 
fering on either breach of contract%r traditional tort t h e ~ r y . ~  
When relying on contract remedies, a purchaser-plaintiff 
must overcome the general rule denying damages for mental an- 
guish resulting from breach of contract by successfully applying 
one of the following exceptions. First, sufficient proof that the 
defendant's conduct in breaching the contract was reckless, will- 
ful, or malicious permits compensatory damages that may serve 
a punitive p~rpose .~  Alternatively, if the contract implies or ex- 
presses a duty on the part of the seller to tender the goods or 
services in a civil and decent manner, a showing of willful and 
reckless behavior establishes a breach of contract that would war- 
rant recovery of compensatory damages.' The plaintiff need only 
prove that the resulting mental anguish was within the contem- 
plation of both parties at the inception of the contract. The most 
recognized exception is applied upon a determination that the 
basis of the contract is emotional rather than pecuniary.1° "Where 
other than pecuniary benefits are contracted for, damages have 
been allowed for injury to the feelings."ll 
Some courts have adhered to the general rule denying recov- 
ery for mental anguish for breach of contract but have neverthe- 
less allowed recovery by finding a tortious breach of a legal duty 
stemming from the contractual relationship." Although tort and 
5. Both contract and tort theories apply naturally to the factual circumstances sur- 
rounding a consumer transaction. The consumer expends his resources in exchange for 
goods o;services and expects a commitment from the business to act honestly and fairly. 
A breach of the seller's duty to avoid outrageous conduct constitutes an actionable tort, 
while a breach of a similar duty contemplated by buyer and seller as a substantial element 
of the contract results in an actionable breach of contract. Hirst v. Elgin Metal Casket 
Co., 438 F. Supp. 906 (D. Mont. 1977). See, e.g., Seidenbach's, Inc. v. Williams, 361 P.2d 
185, 191 (Okla. 1961) (Berry, J., dissenting). 
6. E.g., Windeler v. Scheers Jewelers, 8 Cal. App. 3d 844, 88 Cal. Rptr. 39 (1970). 
7. E.g., World Ins. Co. v. Wright, 308 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 1975). 
8. See Jankowski v. Mazzotta, 7 Mich. App. 483, 152 N.W.2d 49 (1967); Comment, 
Remedies- "Extra-Contractual" Remedies for Breach of Contract in North Carolina, 55 
N.C.L. REV. 1125, 1149-50 (1977). 
9. WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS 8 1341, a t  221 (3d ed. 1968)- 
--. - - . - 
10. See Cohen v. Varig Airlines, S.A., 85 Misc. 26 653, 662, 380 N.Y.S.2d 450, 461 
(Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1975). 
11. WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS 8 1341, at 214 (3d ed. 1968). 
12. Lowery v. Kansas City, 337 Mo. 47, 85 S.W.2d 104 (1935); Driekosen v. Black, 
Sivalls & Bryson, Inc., 158 Neb. 531, 64 N.W.2d 88 (1954). 
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contract actions are distinct and independent,13 most courts fail 
to identify the source of the duty breached, blurring the line 
between tort and contract.14 One critic has argued that the dis- 
tinction between tort and contract is a nonissue, since a plaintiff 
should be allowed "to have the issues of fact determined in his 
favor, if the evidence is there, irrespective of the question whether 
a breach of contract or a tort has oc~urred?~ This notion accur- 
ately reflects the recent trend that allows more frequent recovery 
for nervous shock. Between tort and contract, a "gradual equalis- 
ing, or fusing process . . . is taking place."lVI'his simplified ap- 
proach depends on an implicit legal duty to exercise civility and 
decency in contractual as well as noncontractual business trans- 
actions. l7 
A. Origins of the Distinction 
In earlier centuries, all persons engaged in particular trades 
or common callings were held to a duty of care in rendering their 
services, while others who rendered the same services on an occa- 
sional basis were held to no such duty.18 This early distinction was 
justified because those persons engaged in the occupation of per- 
forming specific services, by holding themselves out as 
"common" businessmen such as "common carriers," "common 
farriers," and "common innkeepers," assumed the risk of com- 
pensating those who relied on their public representations of com- 
petence in practicing their particular trades? "Common" busi- 
13. See Otto v. Imperial Cas. & Indem. Co., 277 F.2d 889 (8th Cir. 1960). 
14. See Taylor v. Herbold, 94 Idaho 133, 483 P.2d 664 (1971); Busch v. Interborough 
Rapid Transit Co., 187 N.Y. 388, 80 N.E. 197 (1907); Fridman, The Interactions of Tort 
and Contract, 93 LAW Q. REV. 422, 422-23 (1977). 
15. F'ridman, supra note 14, at 432. 
The defendant could still plead whatever defences he can legitimately raise to 
a claim in tort or contract: but he could no longer dictate to the plaintiff the 
kind of claim which the latter may bring, and then prevent the plaintiff from 
achieving the success which should be his, on the merits of the case. 
Id. at 436. 
16. Id. at 440. 
17. "[A]ccompanying every contract, there is a common law duty to perform with 
care . . . and faithfulness the thing agreed to be done, [the breach of which] is a tort, as 
well as a breach of contract." 74 AM. JUR. Torts 8 24 (1974) (footnote omitted). 
18. Arterburn, The Origin and First Test of Public Callings, 75 U .  PA. L. REV. 411, 
412-16 (1927). 
19. "[Alnyone who held himself out to serve all who might apply was conceived of 
as assuming a public or common calling, and by force of this assumpsit was held to 
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nesses had a duty to practice their trades on demand and to 
exercise skill in performan~e.~~ Those who performed services on 
a casual, one-time basis did so at the risk of the hirer, and any 
injury suffered by the hirer as a result of the worker's negligence, 
lack of skill, or impropriety was suffered without remedy.21 
It would seem that the origin arid basis of the liability of the 
person engaged in a common calling for failure to serve, or for 
lack of care in the performance of the service, is to be found in 
this early developed branch of the action on the case. It was 
because a person held himself out to serve the public generally, 
making that his business, and in doing so assumed to serve all 
members of the public who should apply, and to serve them with 
care, that he was liable . . . for lack of care in the performance 
of the service.22 
The devastating destruction of human capital resulting from 
the Black Death in the fourteenth century left England with a 
serious shortage of laborers. As a result, tradesmen charged any 
price they pleased and often refused to serve in order to increase 
the price of their services. The Statutes of Laborers were passed 
to cope with this problem by forcing tradesmen to accept all 
requests for services and preventing them from charging unrea- 
sonable rates? The public's demand for laborers generated a 
public interest in regulating "common" callings, and correlative 
legislative activity brought stringent regulations and tighter pol- 
icy controls.24 
Fourteenth-century England also saw its population clus- 
tered in small communities separated from each other by treach- 
erous, unimproved highways." Travel was dangerous for the ill- 
equipped or inexperienced. Outlaws roamed the countryside and 
night travel was avoided. Consequently, common carriers and 
innkeepers occupied positions as virtual monop~lies.~~ The com- 
obligate himself to serve all who should apply and to serve with care." Burdick, The Origin 
of the Peculiar Duties of Public Service Companies (pt. I), 11 COLUM. L. REV. 514, 522 
(1911). See 1 B. WYMAN, PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATIONS § 201 (1911); Arterburn, supra note 
18, at 415. 
20. Arterburn, supra note 18, at 413. 
21. Id. at 416. 
22. Burdick, supra note 19, at 515-16. 
23. Arterburn, supra note 18, at 421-22. 
24. 1 B. WYMAN, supra note 19, 8 17. 
25. Wyman, The Law of the Public Callings as a Solution of the Trust Problem, 17 
HARV. L. REV. 156, 160 (1904). 
26. Id. Private businesses, on the other hand, competed for customers in the market- 
place and were regulated by the economic forces of free enterprise. A customer in town 
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mon carriers represented the only safe means of travel, and the 
inn was the only safe place to stay. Because society was particu- 
larly interested in having suitable accommodations available for 
the traveling public,27 the public's role in regulating common car- 
riers and innkeepers was established? 
The unique liabilities imposed on common carriers, inn- 
keepers, and other public' utilities can therefore be traced to two 
factors present in the fourteenth century: (1) the development of 
a general public policy requiring common callings to serve their 
customers with care and (2) the existence of monopolistic charac- 
teristics among particular businesses, which necessitated public 
control through legislative and judicial action.2g In the centuries 
that followed, economic conditions improved and the majority of 
trades known as common callings were dropped from that classifi- 
cation." However, because of their monopoly position in the mar- 
ket, common carriers, innkeepers, and other inherently public 
businesses continued to be regulated by public interests and re- 
mained the only businesses subject to the peculiar duty to serve 
all who sought their services.31 These public service businesses 
have since become subject to other unique liabilities, such as for 
emotional suffering caused by the gross insults and indignities of 
their employees,32 while private businesses have been left to the 
could go from shop to shop, having time to choose and a broad selection to choose from. 
If treated unsatisfactorily, he could leave the shop and go to the next one. Id. a t  159. 
27. 1 B. WYMAN, supra note 19, $9 12, 13. 
28. "The essential thing in all this is the recognition of the common calling as a thing 
apart from the private calling, presenting different conditions, involving the necessity 
therefore of further law than that which suffices to regulate ,ordinary businesses." Wyman, 
supra note 25, at 160-61. 
29. "This extreme form of the police power over public employment remained in the 
legislative branch notwithstanding the general guaranties of individual liberty contained 
in the American constitutions." 1 B. WYMAN, supra note 19, Q 19. See Arterburn, supra 
note 18, a t  423. The courts regularly enforced the common law duty to serve all who 
applied for services and to exercise skill and care in performance. Wyman, supra note 25, 
at 158-59. 
30. Arterburn, supra note 18, a t  427. 
31. "Barber, surgeon, smith and tailor are no longer in common calling because the 
situation in the modem times does not require it; but innkeeper, carrier, ferryman and 
wharfinger are still in that classification." 1 B. WYMAN, supra note 19, 9 20. 
[A]s a result of the rapidly changing economic conditions it soon became more 
and more usual for persons to hold themselves out to serve the public generally 
in all lines of commercial activity, . . . and the assumpsit, so important in 
earlier actions on the case, and implied in the case of one engaged in a common 
calling from the holding-out, was no longer recognized as a necessary element. 
Burdick, supra note 19, at 522-23. See Wyman, supra note 25, a t  158-61. 
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 9 48 (1965). 
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operative restraints of the competitive market systemY 
B. Common Carriers, Innkeepers, and Other Public Utilities: A 
Higher Standard of Conduct 
Section 48 of the Restatement of Torts summarizes the legal 
duty imposed on common carriers, innkeepers, and other public 
utilities to protect a customer's interest in freedom from insulting 
or abusive conduct." The law requires a higher duty of care of 
these businesses in dealing with patrons, and consequently, offen- 
sive words or conduct short of extreme outrage are actionable." 
Common carriers were the first to feel the sting of money 
judgments awarded to patrons suffering from the emotional abuse 
of careless or reckless employees. Recovery was initially based on 
an implied contract to carry passengers both safely and in a de- 
cent and civil manner.36 From this notion evolved the current 
legal duty imposed upon all public utilities to serve the public 
with politeness and respect." 
For example, in Brown v. Fifth Avenue Coach Lines, Inc." 
the plaintiff successfully recovered damages for the "indignity, 
humiliation and nervous strain caused by the insulting and abu- 
sive language" of a bus driver who refused to stop at the plaintiffs 
request.3e The court reasoned that "in an age when psychiatry has 
shown the profound and disastrous effects of mental anguish, 
33. "The processes of competition may be trusted in the case of the shop, they do 
not act with any certainty in the case of the inn." Wyman, supra note 25, at 159 (footnote 
omitted). 
Had the courts in the foqteenth century (when all businesses were common callings) 
been disposed to recognize a duty to refrain from offensive and insulting business practices 
as part of the duty to perform services in a competent manner, the liability for abusive 
conduct causing emotional distress would likely have been imposed on all businesses 
professing competence in a particular trade. Liability would have been avoided only by 
those who engaged in a particular service on an infrequent, casual basis, where the em- 
ployer hired such persons at  his own risk. Yet, most tradesmen had been dropped from 
the "public calling" category by the time the duty to refrain h m  abusive business prac- 
tices likely to cause emotional distress had been imposed on public utilities. The obliga- 
tion of courtesy was generally recognized in the latter part of the nineteenth century, 
Prosser, s u m  note 3, at 59 & n.113, while the exclusion of mpst tradesmen from the public 
calling category was evident in the fifteenth century, Arterbum, supra note 18, at 426. 
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 4 48 (1965). 
35. "It is only where there is a special relation between the parties, as stated in § 48, 
that there may be recovery for insults not amounting to extreme outrage." R~~TATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS 4 46, Comment d (1965). 
36. Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 40, 59 (1956). 
37. The action is now "essentially one in tort." ~ A T E M E N T  (SECOND) OF TORTS Q
48, Comment a (1965). 
38. 16 Misc. 2d 692, 185 N.Y.S.2d 923 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1959). 
39. Id. at 694, 185 N.Y.S.2d at 926. 
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even in the absence of apparent physical injury," a refusal to 
allow recovery for mental anguish would be untenablee40 
The court reasoned that enforcement of the carrier's obliga- 
tion to exercise a high degree of responsibility requires the carrier 
to choose its employees with care.41 It argued that the economic 
pressure resulting from penalties imposed by the court would 
encourage the replacement of reckless and offensive employees. 
The common carrier is "entrusted [with} the lives and limbs and 
comfort and convenience of the whole traveling public, and it is 
certainly as important that these servants should be trustworthy 
as it is that they should be ~ompeten t . "~~ 
This higher duty has also been imposed on those offering 
lodging to the public.43 Innkeepers occupy a position analogous to 
common carriers and are subject to the same high standard of 
care in dealing with their customers.44 In Boyce u. Greeley Square 
Hotel C O . ~ ~  an employee of the defendant-hotel forcibly entered 
the plaintiff's room and charged her and her husband with 
immoral conduct. In allowing recovery for the plaintiff's mental 
suffering, the court held that the general rule denying such recov- 
ery does not apply in cases involving innkeepers since they must 
treat guests civilly and avoid words or conduct that might cause 
emotional distress.46 
The failure of telegraph companies to deliver messages 
promptly or accurately has often injured the emotions of senders 
and receivers. Recovery for emotional distress has been based on 
the commonsense conclusion that persons patronizing telegraph 
companies attach great importance to instant communication 
with others.'' This is especially true in the transmission of mes- 
sages concerning illness or death.48 To recover, the plaintiff must 
prove that the defendant was aware of a blood relationship be- 
tween the communicating parties or some other special circum- 
stance making mental anguish a probable result of failure to 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 695, 185 N.Y.S.2d at 927. 
42. 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS $ 9.3 (1965) (quoting Goddard v. 
Grand Trunk Ry., 57 Me. 202, 213 (1869)). 
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS $ 48, Comment a (1965). 
44. Emmke v. De Silva, 293 F. 17 (8th Cir. 1923); Prosser, supra note 36, at 60. See 
1 B. WYMAN, supra note 19, 8 12. 
45. 228 N.Y. 106, 126 N.E. 647 (1920). 
46. Id. at 190, 126 N.E. at 649. 
47. 29 NEB. L. REV. 481, 483 (1952). See also 22 TEX. L. REV. 106, 106 (1943). 
48. 29 NEB. L. REV. 481, 482 (1952). 
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promptly deliver the message." In many circumstances the na- 
ture of services performed by telegraph companies necessarily 
heightens a customer's interest in mental security.5o Stuart u. 
Western Union Telegraph CO." is a leading case allowing dam- 
ages for mental anguish resulting from a delayed telegraph mes- 
sage. Because of the defendant's negligence, the plaintiff received 
word of his brother's illness too late to comfort him, see him 
before his death, or even attend his funeral. The court awarded 
the plaintiff compensatory damages. Defending the award 
against a motion for rehearing, the court declared that "physical 
pain is no more real than is mental anguish."52 
Mental anguish suits arising from telegraphic communica- 
tions have largely disappeared because of decreased use of teleg- 
raphy as the chief means of emergency communication. It is help- 
ful, however, to understand the rationale for recovery in telegraph 
cases. Telegraph companies held themselves out as the chief and 
perhaps only means of communicating immediately with others. 
Consequently, they had a unique capacity to wound the emotions 
of those who relied on their representation of prompt and accur- 
ate service. Businesses maintaining a comparable position of 
power to wound patrons' feelings should arguably be subject to 
the same high standard of conscientious conduct. 
C. Private Businesses 
While common carriers, innkeepers, and other public utili- 
ties can be held liable for gross insults and indignities, a private 
business' conduct must be extreme and outrageous before recov- 
ery will be granted to an injured consumer.53 "It has not been 
enough that the defendant has acted with an intent which is 
tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emo- 
tional distress, or even that his conduct has been characterized 
by 'malice.' "54 The conduct must be "so outrageous in character, 
and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of 
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable 
49. Id. at 482. 
50. Id. 
51. 66 Tex. 580, 18 S.W. 351 (1885). 
52. Id. at 587, 18 S.W. at 354. .-- -- 
53. "One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes 
severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and 
if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm." ~ T A T E M E N T  (SECOND) 
OF TORTS 8 46 (1965). 
54. Id. 5 46, Comment d. 
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in a civilized ~ommunity."~~ 
The "insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppres- 
sions, or other trivialities" confronted in everyday life are clearly 
not contemplated by the term "outrageous conduct." There is a 
need for freedom of expression "and some safety valve must be 
left through which irascible tempers may blow off relatively 
harmless steam."" Only where there is a special relationship be- 
tween the parties, as set forth in section 48 of the Restatement of 
Torts, is recovery allowed for insults or indignities not amounting 
to extreme outrage.57 
A. An Economic Foundation 
Economic conditions in earlier centuries may have had the 
strongest influence on the development of the public utility status 
and its accompanying unique liabilities." Monopoly thus emerges 
as the principal factor for assigning common carriers, innkeepers, 
and other public utilities a stricter liability for the emotional 
suffering caused by offensive employees. Unlike most private 
businesses, whose competitive success depends on satisfied cus- 
tomers, noncompetitive public utilities can afford to be largely 
indifferent to the emotional welfare of their patrons. 
The public interest in regulating monopolies such as com- 
mon carriers and innkeepers set the stage in the late nineteenth 
century for the imposition of liability for emotional abuse. In 
Chamberlain v. Chandlers5@ Justice Story held that the captain 
of an oceangoing common carrier was not only responsible for the 
passengers' safety and quarters on the ship, but that he was also 
under a duty to provide comforts, necessities, and kindness.'O The 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. "A common carrier or other public utility is subject to liability to patrons 
utilizing its facilities for gross insults which reasonably offend them, inflicted by the 
utility's servants while otherwise acting within the scope of their employment." 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS Q 48 (1965). 
58. The difference between public and private callings has been described as 
a distinction in the law governing business relations which has always had and 
will always have most important consequences. . . . The causes of this division 
are, of course, rather economic than strictly legal; and the relative importance 
of these two classes at any given time, therefore, depends ultimately upon the 
industrial conditions which prevail a t  that period. 
1 B. WYMAN, supra note 19, Q 1 (emphasis added). 
59. 5 F. Cas. 413 (C.C.D. Mass. 1823) (No. 2575). 
60. Id. at 414. 
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captain of the ship was considered to have absolute and sovereign 
control over the obedient will of the  passenger^.^' Passengers 
could not avoid the crew's abusive, insulting, immodest, or vulgar 
conduct. They were forced to endure whatever indecencies the 
captain in his arbitrary discretion allowed.62 From Chamberlain 
v. Chandlers emerged the rule for holding common carriers and, 
later, innkeepers liable for uncivil treatment of their patrons.63 
It is "the unusual power and opportunity afforded the carrier 
[and other public utilities] to wound the feelings of those en- 
trusted to [their] care; and the interest of the public in freedom 
from insult at the hands of those with whom it must come in 
contact, and on whom it must rely for essential helpv6' that neces- 
sitates a special rule applicable to public utilities. The lack of 
competitive forces to regulate employee selection inspired the 
common law doctrine making common carriers and other public 
utilities "subject to liability to patrons utilizing [their] facilities 
for gross insults which reasonably offend them, inflicted by the 
[utilities'] servants while otherwise acting within the scope of 
their employment. "65 
Money judgments serve the legitimate function of forcing 
noncompetitive businesses to suffer the same pecuniary losses 
competitive businesses suffer when they lose customers and prof- 
its as a result of abusive conduct. The courts in effect take the 
place of competitors by applying financial pressure on noncompe- 
titive corporations to employ persons who will serve the public in 
a polite and civil manner? Competitive businesses, on the other 
hand, have traditionally not been subject to liability for their 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. Prosser summarized the development of the rule applied to common carriers, 
innkeepers, and other businesses in the public service arena: "The basis of this special 
rule is obviously the responsibility undertaken by the carrier toward the public, which 
carries with it an obligation of courtesy that does not rest upon ordinary defendants." 
Prosser, supra note 3, a t  60. 
64. Id. 
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 4 48 (1965). See id. 9 48, Comment a. 
66. "The chief value of the rule lies in the incentive which it provides for the selection 
of employees who will not be grossly discourteous to those who must come in contact with 
them, and for the making of proper rules and supervision to enforce them." Restatement 
(Second) of Torts 6 48, Comment a (1965). In Slocum v. Food Fair Stores, 100 So. 2d 396 
(Fla. 1958), the Supreme Court of Florida emphasized the noncompetitkenatweof busi- 
nesses as the special relationship necessary to support a consumer's right to expect cour- 
tesy in business transactons. Id. a t  398. Enforcement of that right is achieved through 
exposure to tort litigation via the broader path of the common law liability summarized 
in 6 48. 
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employees' insults and abuses as long as the actions fall short of 
extreme and outrageous conduct. 
The monopoly rationale for imposing liability no longer ap- 
plies to all businesses expressly contemplated by section 48 of the 
Restatement of Torts. For example, public transportation today 
consists of many competing modes of transportation, i. e., motor 
vehicles, railroads, airlines, and ships, each of which consists of 
numerous companies competing for the traveling consumer. The 
lodging industry is also competitive, as evidenced by vigorous 
promotional campaigns designed to create impressions of hospi- 
tality, friendliness, and cordial service. Only in rare circumstan- 
ces is one forced to patronize a particular carrier or stay in a 
particular inn. Arguably, the competitive forces of the market 
adequately deter uncivil and indecent treatment of consumers. 
Rather than expand the number of businesses subject to the 
higher standard of care under section 48 of the Restatement, the 
historical and economic rationale for initially imposing liability 
indicates that the classification should be narr~wed.~' 
B. Reducing the Scope of Liability Under Section 48 
Liability should be keyed to the actor's conduct rather than 
a business' status as common carrier, innkeeper, or public utility. 
The categorical liability imposed under section 48 should only be 
relied on when there is a legitimate necessity for regulation be- 
yond that provided by the competitive market." Emphasis on 
67. Justice Holmes criticized the uniform application of a categorical notion of liabil- 
ity among all common carriers in The Common Law. 
We do not get a new and single principle by simply giving a single name to all 
the cases to be accounted for. If there is a sound rule of public policy which ought 
to impose a special responsibility upon common carriers, as those words are now 
understood, and upon no others, it has never yet been stated. If, on the other 
hand, there are considerations which apply to a particular class among those so 
designated,-for instance, to railroads, who may have a private individual at 
their mercy, or exercise a power too vast for the common welfare,-we do not 
prove that the reasoning extends to a general ship or a public cab by calling all 
three common carriers. 
0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 161 (1963). 
Professor Burdick noted the irrational continuation of the historical imposition of 
unique liabilities on "common callings": "[Lliability had been repeatedly imposed upon 
those classes, and so their liability for refusal to serve had become a familiar doctrine; as 
so often happens, the rule came to be stated constantly without the original reasons for 
it, and so the reasons were gradually forgotten." Burdick, supra note 19, at 523. 
68. The law should demand a higher standard of conduct whenever a virtual monop- 
oly exists, "otherwise in crucial instances of oppression, inconvenience, extortion and 
injustice there will be no legal remedies for these industrial wrongs." Wyman, supra note 
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conduct would limit recovery to those cases that involve severe 
and intolerable words or actions, consistent with the public policy 
of avoiding fictitious or trivial claims." 'No pressing social need 
requires that every abusive outburst be converted into a tort,"70 
nor is it necessary "for the law to intervene in every case where 
someone's feelings are hurt. "71 
Courts should examine the relative positions of consumer 
and business in each case involving public transportation, public 
lodging, or any other business contemplated under section 48 to 
determine whether the noncompetitive rationale underlying sec- 
tion 48 should apply. If the business is competitive, the court 
should ignore section 48 and rely on the traditional criterion of 
extreme and outrageous conduct. A fortiori, given the historical 
rationale for imposing section 48 liability exclusively on public 
utilities to counter their unchecked monopolistic ability to insult 
and offend customers, the coverage of section 48 should not be 
extended to other competitive private busine~ses.~~ Indeed, most 
of the current cases allowing consumers to recover for mental 
anguish caused by insults, harrassment, and offensive conduct of 
private businesses ignore section 48 and rely instead on section 
46 by finding such conduct "extreme and outrage~us."~ Liability 
25, a t  166. "[Tlhe rule will generally hold true that the more the natural laws of competi- 
tion regulate service and price, the less the State need interfere in these respects; but 
conversely when competition ceases to act efficiently State control becomes necessary." 1 
B. WYMAN, supra note 19, $ 16 (emphasis added). 
"The existence of a special relationship, arising . . . from the inherent nature of a 
non-competitive public utility, supports a right and correlative duty of courtesy beyond 
that legally required in general mercantile or personal relationships." Slocum v. Food Fair 
Stores, 100 So. 2d 396, 398 (Fla. 1958). The emphasis on noncompetitiveness implies that 
those common carriers, innkeepers, and others who actually compete for customers should 
be liable for emotional distress only when caused by intolerable and outrageous conduct. 
69. Unless liability is made to rest in each case upon the severity of the defendant's 
conduct, it would be difficult to formulate a rule permitting recovery without making the 
ordinary man liable for every display of inconsideration of the feelings of others. Wallace 
v. Shoreham Hotel Corp., 49 A.2d 81, 83 (D.C. 1946). 
70. Magruder, supra note 4, a t  1053. 
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 46, Comment d (1965). 
72. The economic concept of social costs, borne by society in the form of disamenities, 
is relevant here. The gross insults and indignities perpetrated by noncompetitive busi- 
nesses are costs borne by society as a whole. When the law awards money damages the 
noncompetitive tortfeasor is forced to pay the social costs of its offensiveness. Competitive 
businesses, on the other hand, bear the immediate costs of their consumer abuse in lost 
patronage and profits. The liability summarized in $ 48should therefore5e restn-ed to 
noncompetitive businesses. See 33 VA. L. REV. 96, 97-98 (1947). 
73. See Eckenrode v. Life of America Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1, 4-5 (7th Cir. 1972) 
(defendant-insurer's coercion of plaintiff to settle "clearly rises to the level of 'outrageous 
conduct' to a person of 'ordinary sensibilities' "); Meyer v. Nottger, 241 N.W.2d 911,918- 
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should be predicated on the intolerable conduct of a tortfeasor 
under the standard set forth in section 46 rather than by classify- 
ing the tortfeasor as a business subject to liability under section 
48. 
Justice Holmes criticized the continuation of a categorical 
imposition of liability. 
If there is no common rule of policy, and common carriers 
[innkeepers and other public utilities] remain a merely empiri- 
cal exception from general doctrine, courts may well hesitate to 
extend significance of those words. . . . Hence it may perhaps 
be concluded that, if any new case should arise, the degree of 
responsibility . . . should stand open to argument on general 
principles. 74 
The general principles upon which recovery should be based are 
clearly those articulated in section 46 of the Restatement of Torts. 
C. Section 46 as the Basis for Liability 
Several recent cases strengthen the argument for avoiding an 
extension of liability under section 48 and instead relying on a 
simplified tort theory grounded on section 46. Courts have with 
increasing willingness awarded damages for mental anguish suf- 
fered by insured parties as the result of extreme settlement tac- 
tics of insurers.15 Often courts couch grounds for recovery in terms 
of extreme and outrageous conduct, relying on two general factors 
identified by both Dean Prosser and the Re~tatement.'~ 
First, courts consider the position or relationship of the par- 
ties to evaluate the defendant's relative power to wound the 
plaintiff's feelings or emotions.77 Second, courts examine the de- 
19 (Iowa 1976) (defendant-mortician's dishonest and uncivil treatment of a customer 
whose deceased father and stepmother were being prepared by defendant for burial was 
declared outrageous); Note, Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Insurance Company: A Trend 
Toward Strict Liability for Emotional Distress in the Insurance Industry, 12 CAL. W.L. 
REV. 591, 601-02 (1976). 
74. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 161-62 (1963). 
75. See World Ins. Co. v. Wright, 308 So. 2d 612 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Note, 
Damages for Mental Suffering Caused by Insurers: Recent Developments In the Law of 
Torts and Contract, 48 N m  DM LAW. 1303, 1306 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Recent 
Developments]. 
76. Recent Developments, supra note 75, at 1306. 
77. "The extreme and outrageous character of the conduct may arise from an abuse 
by the actor of a position, or a relation with the other, which gives him actual or apparent 
authority over the other, or power to affect his interests." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 46, Comment e (1965). See Eckenrode v. Life of America Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1, 4 (7th 
Cir. 1972). 
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fendant's awareness of any mental or physical condition of the 
plaintiff that may make him susceptible to emotional distress." 
Either abuse of the seller's position of authority or intentional 
and flagrant conduct in the face of known susceptibility to emo- 
tional distress constitutes outrageous conduct. In insurance cases, 
tort actions for emotional distress arising from the insurer's unfair 
or abusive settlement tactics is based on the insurer-beneficiary 
relationship, which places the insurer in an unequal position of 
power.'@ Furthermore, when an insurer realizes a beneficiary's 
peculiar susceptibility to emotional injury resulting from his reli- 
ance on insurance proceeds to ameliorate the loss of life or prop- 
erty, the insurer has an implied duty to treat the beneficiary with 
a higher degree of fairness and civility.80 
Several cases involving typical consumer transactions join 
the insurance cases as examples of this approach to recovery for 
emotional distress in consumer transactions. In Lemaldi v. De 
Tomaso of America, the plaintiff purchased a new Pantera 
automobile, which turned out to be a "lemon."82 The plaintiff 
attempted many times to have the defects rectified but was re- 
peatedly evaded, misled, and dissatisfied by the defendant car 
dealer,83 whose action and inaction ultimately left the car inoper- 
able." The New Jersey Court of Appeals held that under the 
78. According to the Restatement reporters: 
Conduct may be characterized as extreme and outrageous when it arises 
from the actor's knowledge that the other is peculiarly susceptible to thi? emo- 
tional distress, by reason of some physical or mental condition or peculiarity. 
The conduct may become heartless, flagrant, and outrageous when the actor 
proceeds in the face of such knowledge, where it would not be so if he did not 
know. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, Comment f (1965). See Eckenrode v. Life of Amer- 
ica Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1, 4 (7th Cir. 1972). 
79. Eckenrode v. Life of America Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1, 5 (7th Cir. 1972). See Recent 
Developments, supra note 75, a t  1307-08. 
80."[I]t is common knowledge that one of the most frequent considerations in pro- 
curing life insurance is to ensure the continued economic and mental welfare of the 
beneficiaries upon the death of the insured." Eckenrode v. Life of America Ins. Co., 470 
F.2d 1, 5 (7th Cir. 1972). 
81. 156 N.J. Super. 441, 383 A.2d 1220 (1978). 
82. Id. at 447, 383 A.2d at 1223. The car's air conditioner fell out on the street, the 
car constantly pulled to the right, the windshield leaked, and the bushings burned out. 
The clutch, radiator, windshield wipers, and transmission all malfunctioned, requiring the 
car to be continually in the shop during the first year of ownership. Id. at446, 383 A2d 
at 1222. 
83. The car dealer and personnel "failed to take or advise him of corrective action or 
to honor his claims." Id. at 447, 383 A.2d at 1223. 
84. The court summed up the pitiful ending to an exasperating experience: "The 
Pantera, beautiful but unusable, now rests in state in a carpeted garage which, plaintiff 
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already exasperating circumstances surrounding the defective 
car, the dealer's conduct "would aggravate an ordinary man to 
the point of 'mental anguish.' "" The defendant's duty toward 
the plaintiff was "largely grounded in the natural responsibilities 
of social living and human relations, such as have the recognition 
of reasonable men; fulfillment is had by a correlative standard of 
conduct ."g6 
The court did not articulate its holding in terms of outra- 
geous conduct under section 46. It referred instead to a "social 
duty" on the car dealer's part to avoid offensive and abusive 
conduct in light of circumstances surrounding this particular 
transaction. The court did not rely on traditional justifications of 
implied contract or warranty, or on an assignment of a higher 
duty of care by analogy to public utility status. Thus, although 
this case characterizes a growing trend to grant relief for 
independent emotional distress suffered in private business 
transactions, the decision was not based on a concrete theory. 
The court could have achieved the same result based on either of 
the two factors in the comments to section 46, which would have 
facilitated a finding of outrageous conduct. The plaintiff in 
Lemaldi was arguably in a much weaker bargaining position than 
the car dealer since his car was a unique and expensive piece of 
machinery that only a competent and experienced dealership 
should attempt to repair. This unequal position of power elevates 
the dealer's duty to avoid offensive treatment of the plaintiff, the 
breach of which could be characterized as outrageous. Alterna- 
tively, the car dealer may still have been liable if he had knowl- 
edge of some physicial or mental condition that made the plain- 
tiff particularly susceptible to emotional distress. The defen- 
dant's knowledge of the plaintiff's unusual emotional interest in 
the purchase of the new Panterag7 would have created circum- 
stances under which defendant's offensive conduct would justify 
a finding of outrageousness and permit recovery under section 46. 
In Wilson u. Redken Laboratories, I n q g g  the plaintiff re- 
covered a large money judgment from a hair products manufac- 
turer whose chemical treatment for hair discoloration ultimately 
resulted in the plaintiff's baldness. The court held that notwith- 
standing the absence of physical pain or injury, the plaintiff 
testified, looks 'better than his room.' " Id. at 446, 383 A.2d at 1223. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. The plaintiff purchased the car on his birthday and kept it in a carpeted garage. 
88. 562 S.W.2d 633 (Ky. 1978). 
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should be compensated for the humiliation and embarrassment 
she experienced as a result of losing her hair? The court made 
no finding of extreme and outrageous conduct, although the re- 
sult of the defendant's negligence could indeed be characterized 
as outrageous. In Wilson the Supreme Court of Kentucky was 
apparently convinced that the emotional interest in the service 
purchased by the plaintiff was intimately associated with the 
defendant's satisfactory performance of the services.90 Liability 
for emotional injury could easily have rested on the defendant's 
abuse of its unique power to wound the plaintiff's emotions or its 
negligent conduct in the face of the plaintiff's known susceptibil- 
ity to emotional distress in the event her hair were discolored or 
lost. Either of these findings would constitute outrageousness and 
provide a clearer, more manageable basis for imposing liability. 
In Hanke v. Global Van Lines, Incgl the plaintiff suffered 
great anxiety and disappointment when the moving company 
repeatedly failed to deliver her personal belongings on promised 
dates? The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit vacated the 
summary judgment ordered by the lower court for the defendant 
and held that the defendant's practices in this case could amount 
to outrageous conduct.g3 The defendant's position of power, and 
ability to wound the feelings of the plaintiff by continually 
"stringing her along" with meaningless promises of delivery, 
could conceivably convert the unfair, unsettling, and irritating 
business practices into outrageous conduct. 
These cases illustrate the trend of providing consumers relief 
from insulting and abusive practices. In order to prevent frivolous 
claims, the chief criterion for relief should be outrageous conduct 
gauged by considerations of the business' relative power to wound 
the customer's emotions and the customer's known susceptibility 
to emotional injury. In transactions involving a violation of legiti- 
mate emotional concern that is sufficiently grievious to warrant 
judicial relief, the plaintiff should rely on these two factors for 
determining outrageous behavior. 
89. Id. at 636-37. 
90. "One of the greatest pains that any person can suffer is the pain of embarrass- 
ment. The sudden loss of Louise's hair was a traumatic shock." Id. at 636. 
91. 533 F.2d 396 (8th Cir. 1976). 
92. The plaintiff was repeatedly informed by telegramthatshe could-expect cteiivery 
of her furniture on specific dates, which came and went without delivery. After complain- 
ing to the Interstate Commerce Commission, she was again assured that she would receive 
delivery on a given date. Again the shipment failed to arrive as promised. Id. at 398. 
93. Id. at 400. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
As courts continue to expand their recognition of the individ- 
ual's right of freedom from emotional and mental abuse, consum- 
ers are likely to occupy an increasing number of seats a t  plaintiff 
tables seeking recovery for emotional distress inflicted by busi- 
nesses and their employees." Insults and abuses that are so atro- 
cious and beyond the bounds of decency as to elicit the exclama- 
tion "Outrageous! "95 are clearly actionable under section 46 of 
the Restatement of Torts. Offensive speech'or conduct of common 
carriers, innkeepers, or other public utilities is currently actiona- 
ble absent outrageous conduct by virtue of the common law, sum- 
marized in section 48 of the Restatement. For consistency with 
the historical rationale underlying the common law expressed in 
section 48, courts should not impose liability for less than outra- 
geous conduct unless a compelling public interest to regulate a 
noncompetitive business exists. 
A difficult situation arises when a private business inflicts 
emotional distress by insulting a customer or engaging in harsh 
business practices that cannot be characterized as extreme and 
outrageous under the traditional meaning of section 46. Legal 
scholars have contemplated the possibility of imposing on private 
businesses the same duty now possessed by public utilities, to 
avoid insulting or undignified service. This proposition should be 
rejected in light of the historical and economic rationale for ini- 
tially imposing liability exclusively on public utilities. The thrust 
of section 48 liability for inflicting emotional distress is consistent 
with the public need for general regulation of public utilties. Both 
the imposition of a higher standard of care under the common law 
and modem legislative regulation of public utilities respond to 
the noncompetitive nature of such businesses and the lack of 
effective consumer control through market forces. Because pri- 
vate businesses are subject to the forces of the competitive mar- 
ket system and are already sensitive to the loss of consumer sup- 
port resulting from dissatisfactory conduct and services, they 
should not be subject to the same judicial supervision through 
tort litigaton necessary in the case of noncompetitive public utili- 
ties. 
94. "[Clonsidering the greater strain that has been placed on one's nervous system 
under modem conditions of high speed living, and in accordance with the current stand- 
ards of propriety, good taste and decency," the judiciary is willing to,find intrusions into 
the emotional aspects of life "actionable over a constantly widening area." Borda, supra 
note 1, at 58 (footnotes omitted). 
95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, Comment d (1965). 
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A logical method of redressing legitimate emotional injuries 
inflicted by private businesses on their customers is to expand the 
concept of outrageous conduct to encompass particularly offen- 
sive business practices. Under this theory, an abuse of a business' 
special position of power over the feelings of a customer, or the 
business' flagrant offensiveness toward a customer while fully 
aware of the customer's susceptibility to emotional distress, could 
be characterized as "outrageous" and actionable under the com- 
mon law summarized in section 46. Only when a business has 
abused a unique position of power or has acted offensively in the 
face of a known susceptibility to emotional distress should the 
business' conduct be characterized as outrageous and intolerable. 
There are specific instances when customers suffer emotional dis- 
tress as a result of offensive business practices. Recovery, how- 
ever, should not become a function of extended public utility 
liability under section 48 of the Restatement of Torts but should 
be based in each case on conduct that, because of the particular 
business relationship of the parties, rises to an intolerable level 
of offensiveness. 
Val John Christensen 
